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UNEMPLOYMENT AND GANG CRIME: 





Empirical evidence reveals that unemployment tends to increase property crime but that it has 
no effect on violent crime. To explain these facts, we examine a model of criminal gangs and 
suggest that there is a substitution effect between property crime and violent crime at work. In 
the model, non-monetary valuation of gang membership is private knowledge. Thus the 
leaders face a trade-off between less crime per member in large gangs and more crime per 
member in small gangs. Unemployment increases the relative attractiveness of large and less 
violent gangs engaging more in property crime. 
JEL Code: K42, D71, D74. 
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We wish to thank Larry Blume for helpful comments. 1 Introduction
Gang crime is a serious and common phenomenon. Based on survey results, the US
Department of Justice estimates that more than 24 500 gangs and 772 500 members
were active in 3300 jurisdictions across the United States in 2000 (OJJDP Fact Sheet,
2002). In Los Angeles, for example, 720 gangs consisting of 39 000 members have been
identiﬁed. These gangs are responsible for a majority of the murders in the city (Los
Angeles Times, February 6, 2007). Moreover, according to a survey of 212 US schools
made in 2006 by the “National Gang Crime Research Center”, 25 percent of American
schools reported a gang shooting near their school during the last year (Knox 2006).
In richer countries, such as the United States, Italy or France, criminal gangs are
often concentrated to relatively poor areas. Organized crime has even more severely
infected countries with widespread poverty, heavy corruption and history of violent
internal conﬂicts, like Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, and several other former Soviet
or Yugoslav Republics. These observations have suggested that tackling unemploy-
ment problem should automatically reduce crime, by improving the outside options of
potential perpetrators.
However, empirical evidence has not established such general connection. In an
extensive analysis of 63 studies, Chiricos (1987) ﬁnds that unemployment has a statis-
tically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on property crime in 40 percent of the studies, while
the eﬀect on violence is statistically signiﬁcant and positive in only 22 percent of the
cases. More recently, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Agell and Nilsson (2003)
and Fougère et al. (2006) ﬁnd a strong positive link between unemployment and prop-
erty crime but a small or no link between unemployment and violent crime for the
US, Sweden and France, respectively. Levitt (2004, p. 170), summarizing a number of
empirical papers, writes that “almost all of these studies report a statistically signif-
icant but substantively small relationship between unemployment rates and property
crime...Violent crime, however, does not vary systematically with the unemployment
rate.”
In this paper we oﬀer a theory of street gangs, which can help to explain the
2ambiguity between unemployment and crime.
To reﬂect the empirical evidence of the gang structure, we model gangs to consist
of leaders and ordinary members. Following Padilla (1992), utility from belonging to
a gang consists of social identity, prestige, protection and respect on the streets, and
beneﬁts from networking with the like-minded. Members diﬀer in their valuation of
these beneﬁts, which is their private knowledge. In return, members have to commit
violent crime, such as extortion or gang violence with the purpose to obtain drug
turfs, or property crime, like pickpocketing or auto theft. Leaders beneﬁtf r o mc r i m e
committed by members. In addition, leaders reap beneﬁts from the total number of
members in terms of prestige, and can, in line with empirical evidence (Padilla 1992
and Levitt and Venkatesh 2000), decide whom to admit as members. Because there are
adverse labor market consequences of gang membership (Hagedorn 1988 and Padilla
1992), our model assumes that gang members cannot ﬁnd jobs in the legal labor market.
M e m b e r sw h ov a l u em e m b e r s h i pm o r ec a na l w a y sm i m i ct h o s ew i t hl o w e rv a l u a t i o n .
As a consequence of this, leaders face a trade-oﬀ. One alternative is to select a highly-
demanding norm that results in a small group with a high level of crime per member,
either in terms of severe property crime or violent crime. The cost is that the leader
has fewer followers to give him prestige. The other alternative is to go for a less-
demanding norm where members are, for example, required to steal cars, leading to a
larger group. Our analysis reveals that a reduction in unemployment may encourage
leaders to either marginally moderate their demands, or to radically change to smaller
g a n g sw i t hm o r es e v e r ec r i m e . B e c a u s em o r eu n e m p l o y m e n tr e d u c e sr e l a t i v e l ym o r e
the amount of crime that leaders can require from the type valuing identity less, leaders
may shift focus from property crime to violent crime at the cost of losing the members
valuing membership least. This helps to explain the empirical observations that, in
aggregate, unemployment tends to increase property crime but not violent crime.
T h ee c o n o m i cl i t e r a t u r eo no r g a n i z e dc r i m ew a sp i o n e e r e db yB u c h a n a n( 1 9 7 3 ) ,N e -
her (1978), Reuter (1983), Schelling (1984) and later Fiorentini and Pelzman (1995).
Buchanan (1973) and Neher (1978) analyze the eﬀect of the number of criminal organi-
3zations. Akerlof and Yellen (1994) analyze the relationship between police enforcement
against gangs and community co-operation. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) study em-
pirically the ﬁnancial activities of a drug-selling street gang. Konrad and Skaperdas
(1997) analyze how gangs’ ability to commit aﬀects violence and Skaperdas (2001)
studies other determinants of organized crime.
In an intriguing recent contribution, Mansour et al. (2006) model the formation of
gang structure as endogenous. They ﬁnd that deterrence can have the eﬀect of breaking
up drug cartels formed by criminal organizations, which leads to larger output and lower
prices. Like Mansour et al. (2006), we also identify a case in which a change that could
be ex ante expected to have an unambiguously positive impact, in our case reduction
in unemployment, may backﬁre by increasing criminality. However, in our framework
backﬁring may happen without a change in the number of gangs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model and basic results are
presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we show how unemployment aﬀects crime. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Model
A gang consists of leaders and members. Members may join a gang in order to obtain
“identity”, as is most evident in case of ethnic gangs, or to beneﬁt from protection
that the gang provides to its members (see e.g. Padilla 1992 and Anderson 1999).
In exchange for providing membership beneﬁts, leaders can, but need not, require
members to commit crimes. There are two types of crime: property crime and violent
crime. By violent crime, we denote more severe crime like robberies, extortion, or gang
violence with the purpose to obtain drug turfs. There is a discontinuity in the amount
of violent crime one can commit: it has to be either zero or reach a minimum level,
denoted by cv. Property crime, on the other hand, can take any non-negative values.
These assumptions are motivated by the empirical facts that violent crimes, even in
their milder forms, in most countries are punished harshly by the society. Property
crime, however, may start from modest shoplifting, which may lead to low costs if
4caught, and range up to stealing cars or burglary.
Leaders derive monetary utility from crimes that members are required to commit
on their behalf, and from the total number of members. There are two types of mem-
b e r s ,1a n d2 ,d i ﬀering in their valuation of gang membership. We denote variables
referring to type j, j ∈ {1,2} by subscript j.1 The number of potential members of
type j is nj, and the number of members of type j who stay and are not expelled is
mj, giving as total membership m = m1 +m2. The number of leaders is normalized to
unity.
At the ﬁrst stage, leaders declare a minimum level of crimes (b cp,b cv) required from
members. At the second stage, members decide how much crimes to commit. After
observing the crimes committed by individual members, leaders decide whether to keep
them or expel them.
Leaders cannot distinguish an individual member’s private valuation of member-
ship. This is a reasonable assumption, as members who value identity highly have an
incentive to lie about their type. Leaders therefore must establish a norm asking for
one level of crimes only.
Committing property crimes of level cp generates a cost λ
pcp. λ
p is a marginal
cost parameter capturing sanctions by the justice system, as well as possible social
and psychological costs. Committing violent crimes of level cv generates a cost λ
vcv.
λ
v is a marginal cost parameter capturing sanctions by the justice system, social and
psychological costs, as well as the risk of injuries and physical or psychological suﬀering
associated with criminal activities. Members of type j receive beneﬁts αj from mem-
bership, so that α2 >α 1. Total utility for a member of type j who chooses a level of
property (violent) crimes c
p
j (cv
j) and is not expelled is







while the utility of the expelled members is outside option w. Outside option w may
reﬂect, among other things, labor market prospects of tentative members. As mem-
1Our results would generalize into more than 2 discrete groups.
5bership in a gang may easily stigmatize, it is assumed that outside option is available
o n l yf o rt h o s ew h od on o tb e l o n gt oag a n g . 2


















v > 0, leaders receive a positive utility from the aggregate
level of property and violent crimes by their gang members, and from the number of
members who stay. One reason why leaders have a reason to care about the number
of members, even if members do not, is that leaders are evaluated according to how
many followers they have. We call the utility that leaders derive from the number of
followers prestige.
Leaders may expel those who commit less crimes than they require, in which case
the expelled lose membership beneﬁts and receive payoﬀ of outside option w.L e a d e r s
announce a minimum level of criminality required, characterized by (b cp,b cv),a n dt h e n
expel the members who do not fulﬁll it. Expulsion following defection is necessary
to maintain credibility. Crimes are committed and membership beneﬁts are received
as a ﬂow. For both types of members, the participation constraint is that the ex-









2While we model the outside option as uniform for all members, the results could be easily general-
ized to a case in which there are several groups of members, each with its own outside option. In that
case, leaders could price discriminate between potential members belonging to population groups with
varying levels of outside option. What drives the result is that the diﬀerence between the valuation
of gang membership and the outside option is private knowledge. If we would assume that valuation
is common knowledge, then all results would go through assuming that the outside option is private
knowledge, and there are two possible levels. Our framework could also be extended to include both
being private knowledge, in which case there would be several discrete groups.
6needs to be satisﬁed for type j to stay. Notice that whether violent crime is proﬁtable
for leaders depends on how the diﬀerence between the returns to diﬀerent types of
crime to leaders relates to the diﬀerence between the costs of diﬀerent types of crime
to members. Without loss of generality, we assume that if indiﬀerent between violent
crime and property crime, leaders choose property crime. We ﬁnd:













Lemma 1 provides a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for a gang leader to
require violent crime. The condition is not suﬃcient as it does not compare yet payoﬀs
from alternative strategies. For example, requiring only property crime may be optimal
to keep members with lower valuation on board. We next establish that leaders do at
least as well by focusing on only one type of crime than by asking a positive level of
both property and gang crime:
Lemma 2 Focusing on only property or violent crime gives at least as high a utility
than requiring a strictly positive level of both.
Proof. See Appendix.
Leaders face two alternative strategies. One is to choose such level of crimes that
both types stay, and another to choose such a level that only type 2 stays. When
pursuing either strategy, leaders have to decide whether to ask for property crime or
violent crime. Note that as there is a minimum value of violent crime that is feasible,
7it may be that the strategy of requiring violent crime is not feasible. The condition
that has to be satisﬁed for requiring violent crime from type 1 is
Condition 1. Leaders can require violent crime from type-1 members if and only if
w ≤ α1 − λ
vc
v.
Correspondingly, it holds for type 2 that
Condition 2. Leaders can require violent crime from type-2 members if and only if
w ≤ α2 − λ
vc
v.
Provided Condition 1 is satisﬁed, leaders can choose a strategy of requiring a level
of violence with which type-1 members are indiﬀerent between staying and leaving.







Provided that Condition 2 is satisﬁed, leaders can choose a strategy of requiring
a level of violence with which type-2 members are indiﬀerent between staying and







Note that as α2 >α 1, Condition 2 implies that Condition 1 is also satisﬁed. The
reverse need not hold. The other two strategies are choosing a requirement of property
crime so that either both types or only type-2 stays. If leaders want to ensure both







for the (n1 + n2) members that stay. If leaders are willing to sacriﬁce type 1 members







for the n2 staying members.
We can now solve for the optimal strategies by leaders:




















2 otherwise. (iii) If (4) and Condition 2 are satisﬁed but Condition 1 is not













Note that in each regime that is listed in Proposition 1, leaders face a choice between
a smaller gang with more crime per member, and a large and less demanding gang.
The proposition has several implications:
First of all, prestige that leaders derive from the number of members may, but need
not, encourage leaders to reduce their requirement of crime.3 For example, because of
prestige considerations, leaders may opt for a larger gang that pursues property crime,
instead of a small one specializing in violent crime, as evident from case (iii).
3Note that leaders may choose a larger gang even if they would not derive utility from prestige.
To see this, notice that if n2/n1 would approach to zero, the right-hand sides of (9), (10) and (11)
would each be negative. Then, a larger group would be optimal even without prestige.
9Second, toughening the punishment for violent crime or reducing the punishment for
property crime may encourage gang leaders initially pursuing violent crime to switch
to property crime. To see this, notice that leaders may ﬁnd it optimal to pursue
violent crime only if (4) is satisﬁed, and that λ
p (λ
v) includes marginal cost of property
(violent) crime for members.
Also, changing the payoﬀso fd i ﬀerent types of crime to leaders has corresponding
eﬀects. For example, reducing proﬁts that leaders derive from property crime (that is,
reducing β
p) may result in a backlash in violence if leaders change strategies to smaller
and more violent gangs.
3 Unemployment and Crime
Taking into account that unemployment is usually only temporary and that a career as
a member of criminal gang may exclude employment in the legal market, it is natural
to interpret the outside option w to reﬂect the expected income available from the
legal labor market. With a given level of wages, a reduced unemployment improves the
outside option w that the members face. One could expect this to be unequivocally
beneﬁcial when targeting crime. However, notice that when the valuation of gang
membership is private knowledge, leaders suﬀer from mimicking constraint if they
want to keep also members of type 1. As members of type 2 can claim to be of type
1, keeping type 1 members restricts the level of crime that can be extracted from type
2, also. Increasing the outside option w reduces relatively more crime that can be
required from type 1 members, rendering keeping them relatively more expensive in
terms of forgone crime. This intuition can be summarized as two propositions:
Proposition 2 If membership does not change, a decrease in unemployment results
in a marginal reduction in crime, whether the gang specializes in violent or property
crime.
Proof. By Proposition 1, leaders choose (5), (6), (7) or (8). The claim follows as
each of these is decreasing in w, corresponding to a decrease in unemployment.
10Proposition 3 An decrease in unemployment may trigger a change from a larger gang
with less crime to a smaller gang with more crime, including a possible shift from a
gang specializing in property crime to a smaller gang specializing in violent crime.
Proof. When the right-hand side of (9), (10) or (11) is negative, it is never optimal
to choose such a strategy that leads to a smaller gang. When the right-hand side
is positive, whether leaders go for a smaller gang with more low-intensity crime or
a larger gang with more high-intensity crime depends on their relative valuation of
diﬀerent types of crime and prestige from membership. As the right-hand sides are
then decreasing in w, a decrease in unemployment may trigger a switch to the smaller
gang with more crime.
Propositions 2 and 3 have empirically testable implications. Proposition 2 implies
that if reduced unemployment is not associated with a change in the size of gangs, then
total amount of crime that leaders receive should decrease. Proposition 3 implies that
if a small reduction in unemployment would lead into a change in gang membership,
this would be a switch to a more hard-line gang, either with a discrete increase in the
level of property or violent crime, or a switch from property to violent crime.
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 provide an economic interpretation for why empirical
studies ﬁnd that while unemployment tends to increase property crime, the eﬀect on
violent crime is not clear. If gangs become smaller when unemployment is reduced,
then they may also become more violent. In this case, leaders replace property crime
by violent crime. However, if the size of gangs does not change, then both property
and violent crime are reduced when unemployment goes down.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper suggests an explanation to the empirical regularity whereby unemployment
tends to increase property crime, but not violent crime. We focus on gangs and suggest
that there is a substitution eﬀect between property crime and violent crime at work.
Gang members diﬀer in their valuation of gang membership and this is their private
11knowledge, while the outside option of gang members reﬂects observable labor market
situation, and is negatively linked to unemployment. Members with high valuation can
always mimic those with lower valuation. Thus, gang leaders have to choose a common
norm of crime to all members who are identical in their observable characteristics,
including the outside option. A reduction in unemployment makes the mimicking
eﬀect more severe. The reason is that reduced unemployment improves the outside
option for both the members with low valuation of gang membership and those with
high valuation. The improved outside option reduces the willingness to pay for gang
membership for both types, the reduction being relatively larger for members with
a lower valuation. As a result, it may be optimal for leaders to forgo membership
beneﬁts from those with low valuation of membership, and establish a higher level
of requirement that only those with high valuation are willing to satisfy. Hence, a
reduction in unemployment may cause a move towards smaller and more violent gangs,
thus increasing violent crime.
Our results should not be interpreted as an advice not to reduce unemployment, in
fear of this boosting gang violence. Instead, they highlight the need to properly study
violent gangs, in order to anticipate whether such problems are likely to arise. Social
policies that reduce unemployment may backﬁre by resulting in smaller and more crim-
inal gangs. As a result, policing and social policies may, under certain circumstances,
be complements rather than substitutes. In order to cancel the backﬁring eﬀect, re-
duced unemployment may actually call for more rather than less policing in previously
troubled neighborhoods.
Our ﬁnding is connected to the insight by Mansour et al. (2006) who ﬁnd that a
tougher crime deterrence may increase the number of gangs. In their model, policing
targets more eﬃciently large gangs. The potential for backﬁring results when tougher
policing causes large cartels to break into smaller gangs that cannot coordinate to
restricting the amount of drugs sold to the level that would maximize the proﬁts of
a monopoly cartel. However, we ﬁnd that the backﬁring eﬀect need not require that
the number of gangs changes, or that the gangs would coordinate on the amount of
12criminal activity.
Our results also imply a need for an integrated judicial policy: too tough penal-
ties for property crime may backﬁre by resulting in more violent crime. Similarly,
reducing the prestige that leaders derive from membership may backﬁre by hardening
their stance. In addition to gang crime, such a mechanism may help to explain the
radicalization of ideological, ethnic or religious groups under certain circumstances.
We presented our analysis using a simple model in which the marginal beneﬁto f
t h et w ot y p e so fc r i m et ol e a d e r si sc o n s t a n t . The analysis could be straightforwardly
generalized to allow for several types of crimes, each with its own payoﬀs and costs.
By varying the costs of diﬀerent crimes, society can choose which crimes it suﬀers.
Furthermore, changes in unemployment and other forms of outside option aﬀect the
trade-oﬀsa v a i l a b l e .
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APPENDIX
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . (1) Let us ﬁrst analyze an arbitrary positive level e cv of violent
crime, in case cv =0 . The utility cost is for a gang member λ
ve cv. A corresponding
utility cost would arise from increasing the amount of property crime by e cvλ
v/λ
p.T h e
utility that the gang leader would receive from violent crime e cv is β
ve cv. The utility
from replacing this by property crime would be β
pe cvλ
v/λ
p. The utility from property
crime exceeds that from violent crime if β
v < λv
λpβ




Remembering the assumption that in case of indiﬀerence gang leader requires property
crime, a necessary condition for it being proﬁtable to require any positive amount of
violent crime is that β
v > λv
λpβ
p.2 ) W h e n cv > 0,o n eh a sa l s ot ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n t
the participation constraint of potential members. A necessary condition for it being
optimal to require violent crime is that at least members who value membership most
(i.e., members of type 2) are willing to stay at least if no property crime is required in
addition to cv,g i v i n ga sc o n d i t i o nα2 − λ
vcv ≥ w.
Proof of Lemma 2. Make a counterassumption that the gang leaders would
require a strictly positive level of both types of crime. A necessary condition for this
is that α2 ≥ w +λ
vcv. Otherwise, requiring a positive level of violent crime cannot be




then requiring a positive level of violent crime cannot be optimal by Lemma 1. On the
other hand, if β
v > λv
λpβ
p then it would be optimal to stop requiring property crime and
15increase the requirement of violent crime so that the total burden on members does not
change. This leaves the case in which β
v = λv
λpβ
p. In this case, leaders would receive
the same utility by dropping the requirement of violent crime and replacing this by
increasing the requirement by property crime so that the utility of members does not
change. This completes the proof that leaders never strictly prefer requiring a positive
level of both types of crime.
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ti ti sn e v e ro p t i m a lf o rl e a d e r s
to choose any other level of crime than those speciﬁed in equations (5) to (8). If
leaders would choose a level above either (6) and (8), no members would stay and thus
reducing the level of crime to either of these levels would improve leaders’ utility. If
leaders would require a level of violence (property crime) below (6) ((8)) but above (5)
((7)), then leaders could increase the requirement to the level (6) ((8)) without causing
any members to leave. Correspondingly, if leaders would require a level of violence
(property crime) below (5) ((7)), then leaders could increase the requirement to this
level without causing any members to leave. (i) If (4) is not satisﬁed, it is not proﬁtable
for leaders to require violence. If Condition 2 is not satisﬁed, leaders cannot require
violence as they would then lose all members. In either case, the choice between leaders
is for utility in case of choosing (7) or (8). (ii) By (4) and Condition 1, leaders prefer
to require violence and can choose as the level of violence (5) or (6). The maximization
problems simpliﬁes to choosing between these two. (iii) By (4) and Condition 2 but
not Condition 1 being satisﬁed, leaders prefer to require violence if only members of
type 2 stay, while they have to restrict to requiring property crime if also members of
type 1 stay.
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